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ABSTRACT 
BELLING THE CAT: THE NEO-TALIBAN INSURGENCY IN AFGHANISTAN 
by 
Andrew R. Smith 
University of New Hampshire, December, 2011 
It has been over a decade since the United States and its allies invaded 
Afghanistan under Operation Enduring Freedom. Today, Afghanistan and the Taliban are 
at the forefront of US foreign policy. This thesis aims to define the Taliban movement in 
Afghanistan, from past to present, and asks why they still exist as a political movement 
after a decade of war and counterinsurgency efforts. It discusses the rise of both the 
Taliban and the neo-Taliban and observes their differences and similarities. 
Subsequently, using Cornelia Beyer's "Synthetic Approach," the Taliban insurgency and 
US-led counterinsurgency efforts are analyzed. The Synthetic Approach allows the 
opportunity to look at the Afghan insurgency using multiple variables from an 
international perspective. The Taliban's tactics, edicts, and geopolitical space are dynamic 
and constantly shifting. This thesis employs an equally dynamic theoretical framework 
with which to trace the Taliban and explain their resilient nature. 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
The basic concept of power is the ability to influence others to get them to do 
what you want. There are three major ways to do that: one is to threaten them 
with sticks; the second is to pay them with carrots; the third is to attract them or 
co-opt them, so that they want what you want. If you can get others to be 
attracted, to want what you want, it costs you much less in carrots and sticks. 
- Joseph Nye 
After almost a decade of military and political involvement in Afghanistan, the 
United States and its NATO allies continue struggling to eliminate the "neo-Taliban" 
insurgency. Today's military clashes with the Taliban and predictions of never-ending 
conflict within Afghanistan are stark contrasts to the public declarations of military and 
government leaders in 2005, who stated: "the Taliban is a force in decline;" "US military 
estimates suggest there may be only 800 Taliban fighters left;" and that "Peaceful 
elections are a sign that the Taliban are disorganized, weak, and on the run."1 
Public and private sector analysts, researchers, journalists, politicians, and pundits 
are constantly trying to explain the variables which allow the Taliban to continuously 
combat Western forces, attract recruits, and retain territorial and ideological footholds 
within Afghanistan. With Osama bin-Laden dead, relations with Pakistan colder than 
ever, and cooperation with President Hamid Karzai and the Afghan government faltering; 
the United States and its NATO allies are desperately looking to adopt an effective 
strategy which can eliminate the major threats of the neo-Taliban insurgency and 
facilitate the establishment of a stable Afghanistan able to govern and protect itself. In 
Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 1. 
2 
reality, no one expects that Afghanistan will be wholly at peace when NATO troops 
withdraw, nor that the Taliban insurgency will have been routed.2 On June 22nd, 
President Obama announced that America will begin drawing down its troops in 
Afghanistan in July 2011, effectively marking the end of the troop "surge" which began 
in late 2009.3 However, for many Americans worried about troubles at home and the 
ineffectiveness of political and military strategy in Afghanistan, the essential question is: 
Why is the United States still fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan after removing them 
from power over a decade ago and investing billions of dollars in resources and man 
power to stabilize the country?4 
Research on the Taliban, the neo-Taliban and the Afghan insurgency continues to 
develop as events and information regarding the war unfold. The complexity of 
Afghanistan and the region cannot be encompassed in one study or understood through a 
single perspective. The neo-Taliban insurgency is a regional insurgency, with military 
and ideological roots dating back to the Cold War. This analysis builds on the developing 
field of Taliban and neo-Taliban research by applying an analytical framework that uses a 
synthesis of realist and constructivist ideas in order to provide an international 
perspective on the neo-Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. The analysis proposes an 
international perspective which applies the ideas of power, polarity, equilibrium, 
hegemony, and the mutuality of both ideas and material facts to the Taliban and Afghan 
insurgency in order to help explain the complex dynamics underlying the ongoing 
2
 "Neither a picnic nor a Switzerland," The Economist, June 23, 2011, 56. 
3
 The Economist, "Neither a picnic nor a Switzerland," 56. 
4
 For U.S. foreign assistance breakdown and totals, see CRS Report: Tarnoff, Curt. "Afghanistan: U.S. 
Foreign Assistance" Congressional Research Service. August 12, 2010. 
3 
conflict and provide a better understanding of the variables which prevent an easy peace 
in the country and the region. 
The analysis begins in Chapter 1 with a history of the Taliban in Afghanistan, 
tracing their ideological and developmental roots beginning with the Mujahedeen fighters 
of the Soviet-Afghan war and ending with the inception of the neo-Taliban insurgency of 
today. Chapter 2 is a review of Taliban and neo-Taliban literature. The literature is 
separated into three categories by level of analysis, starting with the individual and 
leading to the state and regional levels. This chapter also introduces the synthetic 
framework laid out by Cornelia Beyer and explains how her approach will be adapted to 
the neo-Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. Chapter 3 focuses on applying the synthetic 
approach to Afghanistan. The chapter combines various ideas from the paradigms of 
realism and constructivism in order to better understand the roles that state and non-state 
actors play in Afghanistan. Uni-multipolarity, power equilibrium, hegemony, and tit-for-
tat are some of the ideas used to help analyze major variables of the Afghan insurgency, 
such as state corruption, insurgency/counterinsurgency strategy, and the relationships 
between state and sub-state actors in Afghanistan and the region. Chapter 4 concludes the 
analysis with a summary of the important power dynamics identified in the analysis. With 
the help of Joseph Nye's three-dimensional chess game, the chapter finishes by reflecting 




HISTORY OF THE TALIBAN IN AFGHANISTAN 
The Taliban are an Islamic-fundamentalist group which controlled the majority of 
Afghanistan from 1997 to 2001. Since their emergence after the Soviet-Afghan war, the 
Taliban have played many different roles. The Taliban began as a revolutionary 
grassroots movement, and eventually became the recognized government of the state of 
Afghanistan. The Taliban were removed from power by the United States and its allies 
during Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001. Today the Taliban have become an integral 
part of the Afghan insurgency. There are few constants which accurately describe the 
Taliban throughout their modern history. Their leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar rarely 
appears in public or meets with media, furthering the mysticism and conjecture regarding 
the structure of the Taliban leadership and their administrative methods. Outlining the 
complex history of the Taliban and the actors involved is essential for understanding why 
they continue to function as an insurgent group in Afghanistan and why their ideology 
has remained popular among rural and tribal Afghans despite the counterinsurgency 
efforts of NATO forces currently in Afghanistan. 
The Taliban: From Mujahedeen to Political Movement: 
The structural and ideological roots of the Taliban began with the Mujahedeen 
during the Soviet-Afghan war. Any Afghan who took up arms against occupying Soviet 
forces and engaged in jihad were, "in the true sense, Mujahidin, or fighters in a holy war. 
Mujahedeen parties assigned their own leaders at the local level and some of these rose to 
prominence."5 The Mujahedeen were a complex group of Islamic jihadists controlled by 
various military leaders from different ethnic and religious backgrounds. Seven of the 
most influential groups comprising the Mujahedeen were eventually recognized by the 
Pakistani government and receive major financial aid and military hardware in order to 
fight the Russian military.6 These influential groups of Mujahedeen fighters were: 
Jamiat-i-Islami, Hisb-e-Islami led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Hisb-e-Islami led by Younis 
Khalis, Ittihad-i-Islami, the Afghan National Liberation Front, Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-
Islami, and Mahaz-i-Milli-i-Islami.7 
Table I8 






































 Peter Marsden, The Taliban: War and Religion in Afghanistan (New York: Zed Books Ltd., 2002), 26. 
6
 Marsden, War and Religion in Afghanistan, 28. and Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and 
Fundamentalism in Central Asia (Yale University Press, 2010), 18. 
7
 Marsden, War and Religion in Afghanistan, 29-32. 
8
 Data Source: Marsden, Peter. The Taliban: War and Religion in Afghanistan. New York: Zed Books Ltd, 
2002. 
Mahaz-i-Milli-i- PirGailani Moderate Pushtun 
Islami 
Junbish-i Milli-yi Rashid Dostum Militant Uzbek 
Islami 
In the early 1980's, each of the seven major Mujahedeen groups received official 
recognition as Pakistan selected and funded specific resistance groups to fight against 
Russian forces in Afghanistan.9 
Islamist leaders that were previously unknown now found access to international 
assistance through the ISI1 and were able to form extensive networks of armed 
political organizations. They were given free reign over millions of Afghans who 
were living in refugee camps in Pakistan, and the assistance they received was 
used to recruit and influence the refugee populations. Their connections with the 
Islamists in Pakistan allowed them to build bridges with other Islamists and 
conservative groups in North Africa, the Middle East, and North America, 
energizing the flow of activists and resources to Afghanistan as well as 
throughout the larger network of Islamists around the world.11 
Prior to the Soviet-Afghan war, Islamists barely had a base of influence in Afghan 
society. However, with the majority of war funds and arms distributed to Islamist groups 
such as Hizb-e-Islami led by Hekmatyar and Jamiat-e-Islami led by Burhannudin 
Rabbani; they were able to build highly centralized, political organizations which wielded 
"tremendous clout" by the end of the war.12 
However, each Mujahedeen group was not built on the same ideology, ethnicity, 
or with the same goals in mind. These differences only began to play a major role after 
the end of the Soviet-Afghan war. Four of the major Mujahedeen parties defined 
themselves as Islamist: seeking to create a political movement with an ideological base 
9
 Neamatollah Nojumi, "The Rise and Fall of the Taliban," in The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan, 
ed. Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2008), 91. 
10
 The ISI is Pakistan's Interservices Intelligence Agency 
11
 Nojumi, "The Rise and Fall," 92. 
12
 Rashid, Taliban, 19. 
7 
that drew on reinterpretation of the essential elements of Islam.13 The remaining 
Mujahedeen groups defined themselves as traditionalists: "they emerged from traditional 
tribal or other groupings within Afghanistan."14 The various tribal, ethnic, and ideological 
differences among Mujahedeen groups would not lead to significant conflict during the 
war. At the time, the Mujahedeen militant groups and commanders were united by a 
common goal to resist the imposition of Russian communism and the destruction of both 
tribal and Islamic ways of life. Additionally, abundant and continuous financial and 
military aid from foreign governments and beneficiaries eliminated the need for 
competition among Mujahedeen parties for resources.15 However, the withdrawal of 
Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989 would pit former Mujahedeen parties against one 
another in a struggle to control territory and find alternative sources of income. 
Before withdrawing from Afghanistan, the Soviet Union established a puppet 
government under the control of Muhammad Najibullah. Through foreign financial 
support, the Soviet Union was able to keep Najibullah in power after their military 
withdrew. Najibullah's regime managed to control most of the major urban areas in 
Afghanistan while Mujahedeen factions fought over control of rural and tribal areas.1 
Until 1992, Najibullah controlled Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif, Kandahar, Herat, and 
Jalalabad.17 Najibullah fell from power when his most prominent militia leader, Rashid 
13
 Marsden , War and Religion in Afghanistan, 28. 
14
 Ibid., 19. 
15
 Ahmed Rashid's research indicates that the Mujahedeen received a total of over ten billion dollars, most 
in the form of weaponry, from the combined contributions of the United States, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and 
other European and Islamic countries. 
1
 Marsden, War and Religion in Afghanistan, 36. 
Ibid., 35. 
8 
Dostam, deserted and joined forces with Burhannudin Rabbani, the leader of the 
Mujahedeen group Jamiat-e-Islami, setting the stage for "the armed but peaceful entry of 
the Mujahedeen into Kabul on April 25th, 1992."18 However, the capture of Kabul by new 
leaders would result in further fractionalization among Mujahedeen and ex-Mujahedeen 
forces as each vied for power. 
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the leader of one faction of Hisb-e-Islami became angry, 
arguing that he had been cheated on the power-sharing deal between himself, Rabanni 
and Dostam regarding the capture of Kabul. In order to assert himself and the power of 
Hisb-e-Islami in Kabul, Hekmatyar provoked a civil war, shelling Kabul in an attempt to 
delegitimize Rabbani and gain power. By 1994 Afghanistan and Kabul were in a state of 
virtual disintegration after fifteen years of war. Rashid's analysis shows that 
Afghanistan "was divided into warlord fiefdoms and all the warlords had fought, 
switched sides and fought again in a bewildering array of alliances, betrayals and 
bloodshed."21 Northern Afghanistan was controlled by Dostum, who had subsequently 
broken his alliance with Rabbani. Rabbani controlled Kabul and northeast Afghanistan. 
Herat was under the control of another warlord, Ismael Khan. Mujahedeen commanders 
based in Jalalabad controlled the eastern border provinces. Finally, southern Afghanistan 
was controlled by "dozens of petty ex-Mujahedeen warlords and bandits who plundered 
the population at will."22 By the mid 90's, Afghanistan was in a state of chaos and 
18
 Rashid, Taliban, 21. and Marsden, War and Religion in Afghanistan, 37. 
1
 Marsden, War and Religion in Afghanistan, 37. 
20
 Rashid, Taliban, 21. 
21
 Ibid., 21. 
22
 Ibid., 21. 
9 
borderline anarchy. The stage was set for any domestic group with enough political and 
material resources to force their way into a position of power. 
It is also important to note the absence of international relations with Afghanistan 
after the end of the Soviet-Afghan war and leading up to the Taliban's run for power. 
Afghanistan failed to register at the international level in the early nineties.23 Barnett 
Rubin's research on Afghanistan points out that "The U.N., the U.S., and Russia 
abandoned efforts at conflict resolution in the country after April 1992, and the regional 
powers stepped into the breach."24 The UN's humanitarian efforts in Afghanistan were 
limited by danger and the security of personnel, lack of government, and failure of world 
powers to fund most of the programs it did propose.25 Political turmoil within 
Afghanistan was largely ignored by the international community and left to be resolved 
by the various warlords and factions waging civil war within the country. The 
governments of Central Asia, as well as Russia, expressed concern about the spread of 
weapons, disorder, and extremist Islamic movements from Afghanistan during the 
nineties. Unfortunately, the international climate was not focused on Afghanistan or 
central Asia and no significant steps were taken to bring the country under control. 
The Taliban's Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan: 
While warring fiefdoms throughout Afghanistan continued to harass one another 
for control of cities and provinces; groups of Mujahedeen and ex-Mujahedeen who had 
fought the Najibullah regime began re-convening to discuss possible resolutions to 
23
 Barnett R. Rubin "Afghanistan in 1993: Abandoned but Surviving," Asian Survey 34 (1994): 190, 
accessed June 20, 2011, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2645121. 
24
 Rubin, "Afghanistan in 1993," 190. 
10 
ending the violence. Ahmed Rashid concisely summarizes the inception of the Taliban as 
a group in his analysis: 
After much discussion these divergent but deeply concerned groups chalked out 
an agenda which still remains the Taliban's declared aims - restore peace, disarm 
the population, enforce Sharia law and defend the integrity and Islamic character 
of Afghanistan. As most of them were part-time or full-time students at 
madrassas, the name they chose for themselves was natural. A talib is an Islamic 
student, one who seeks knowledge compared to the mullah who is one who gives 
knowledge. By choosing such a name the Taliban (plural of Talib) distanced 
themselves from the party politics of the Mujahedeen and signaled that they were 
97 
a movement for cleansing society rather than a party trying to grab power. 
The Afghans who united under the mission of the Taliban chose Mullah Mohammed 
Omar as their leader and quickly began to assert their dominance over the various 
warlords and factions fighting for the control of Southern Afghanistan. 
To outsiders, the Taliban seemed to appear out of nowhere when they first came 
to the world's notice in 1994.28 The Taliban's first military conquests were over 
roadblocks, checkpoints, and small garrisons run by bandits and mercenaries along the 
main roads of Southern Afghanistan. The specific events which catalyzed Mullah Omar's 
mobilization of a small group of Taliban to combat better equipped Kandahar warlords 
are subject to "an entire factory of myths and stories."29 However, what is certain is that 
the Taliban's initial successes helped Omar emerged as a "Robin Hood figure, helping 
the poor against the rapacious commanders."30 The Taliban's reputation as righteous, 
heroic protectors of rural and tribal populations spread like wildfire throughout Southern 
Afghanistan. 
27
 Rashid, Taliban, 22-23. 
28
 Marsden, War and Religion in Afghanistan, 44. 
29
 Rashid, Taliban, 25. 
11 
Following their initial victories in the countryside, the Taliban advanced on 
Kandahar and took the city with almost no resistance. The Taliban announced to the city 
that it was their mission to free Afghanistan of its corrupt leadership and create an 
Islamic society.31 They began issuing decrees requiring men to wear turbans, beards, 
short hair, shalwar kameez2 and for women to wear the burqa?3 Women were banned 
from working and from attending school. Further decrees banned music, games, radio 
and television. Regardless of their strict codes, the Taliban's ability to bring order to 
Kandahar after two years of virtual anarchy earned them considerable popularity among 
the population. The Taliban's popular support, combined with their distinctive white 
turbans and obvious religious fervor and purity, lent them an almost supernatural aura.34 
As the Taliban's reputation preceded their advances Westward from Kandahar, they 
continued to meet little resistance from the armed groups and bandits who had previously 
controlled the areas.35 
After establishing a base of operations in Kandahar, the Taliban quickly found an 
ally in President Rabbani who still had control of Kabul. Rabbani promised to help the 
Taliban with funds if they opposed Hekmatyar, who was relentlessly laying siege to the 
city. The Taliban also bolstered their armaments and numbers by seizing abandoned 
weaponry and encouraging local people to join the ranks of their fighters. Early support 
Marsden, War and Religion in Afghanistan, 45. 
32
 Traditional dress worn by both men and women in South Asia and Central Asia, composed of loose 
fitting trousers and a long shirt or tunic. 






for the Taliban also came from Islamic fundamentalist groups in Pakistan. Many high 
ranking Taliban officials had grown up and studied in madrassas run by extremist groups 
such as Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam (JUI) while living in Pakistani refugee camps during the 
war.37 Old ties to fundamental madrassas throughout the refugee areas of Pakistan would 
be the major source of the Taliban's military manpower as they continued to advance 
through Afghanistan.38 By December 1994, some 12,000 Afghan and Pakistani students 
had joined the Taliban in Kandahar.39 
On September 5th, 1995 the Taliban captured Herat from Ismail Khan's forces. 
They set about implementing the same edicts and laws they had in Kandahar, this time to 
the chagrin of the local population. On September 1 l l , 1996 the Taliban marched into 
Jalalabad and on the 26th they successfully captured Kabul.40 Within days the Taliban 
moved north and began engaging Dostam's forces in order to capture the remaining 
provinces of Afghanistan. Pakistan recognized the Taliban as the legitimate government 
of Afghanistan in early 1997. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates followed 
Pakistan's example and officially recognized the Taliban as well.41 To consolidate their 
leadership role, the Taliban renamed the country the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. 
However, the Taliban's extremely oppressive religious edicts began to take their toll 
economically, mentally, and socially on the newly acquired cities of Herat and Kabul 
36
 Marsden, War and Religion in Afghanistan, 45. 
37




 Ibid., 29. 
40
 Marsden, War and Religion in Afghanistan, 48. 
41
 Ibid., 52. 
13 
The Taliban leaders were all from the poorest, most conservative and least literate 
Southern Pashtun provinces of Afghanistan.42 In Mullah Omar's village: "Women had 
always gone around fully veiled and no girl had ever gone to school because there were 
none."43 Omar and his colleagues transposed their own "milieu," their own experience, or 
lack of it, with women, education, and culture to the entire country and justified their 
policies through the Koran.44 The forceful, extremist dominion that the Taliban created in 
diverse, modernizing cities such as Herat and Kabul ignored centuries of cultural 
tradition and development. The majority of Afghanistan was not even remotely like the 
south, where the Taliban originated.45 Afghan Pashtuns in the east were proud to send 
their girls to school, forty percent of Kabul women worked, Herat's female elite spoke 
French as a second language; Afghans went to the movies, played sports, and danced and 
sang at weddings.46 The new Taliabn rulers viewed all these activities as signs of iniquity 
and saw "northerners" as impure Muslims who had to be forcibly re-Islamicized.47 
In stark contrast to the Taliban's early image as liberators, their oppressive rule 
changed the perceptions of citizens. Afghans began to see the Taliban as a type of hostile 
occupier in major cities. Within twenty-four hours of taking Kabul, all women were 
banned from work, girl's schools and colleges were shut down, and new dress codes were 
42











imposed. Once again, the Taliban banned TV, videos, satellite dishes, music and all 
games including chess, football and kite-flying.48 
The Taliban set up a six-man Shura to rule Kabul, which was dominated by 
Durrani Pashtuns and did not include a single Kabuli[.. .]None of the Shura 
members had ever lived in a large city, most had never even visited Kabul, but 
they were now running a vibrant, semi-modern, multi-ethnic city of 1.2 million 
people in which Pashtuns were only a small minority.49 
For all intents and purposes, Kabul was treated as an occupied city by the Taliban in 
order to force their beliefs among the population and create their version of an ideal, 
Islamic state. 
For the first time in Afghanistan's history, the Taliban began to institutionalize 
Islamism in a top to bottom process within the state bureaucracy and society at large.50 
However, during the Taliban's reign they were never able to make the transition from 
popular movement to effective state government. The Taliban, like many other popular 
revolutionary movements, "failed to differentiate between running a popular militaristic 
movement and administering a functioning state."51 The inability of Taliban leadership to 
bridge the political gap between themselves and the people they governed would further 
seclude the Taliban within their own ideology and leave them disconnected from the 
domestic and international affairs of the Afghan state. 
Key Taliban leaders were expected to play both civil and military roles due to 
constant fighting on multiple fronts. Even with control over the majority of Afghan 
provinces, the Taliban had to spend most of its time and resources fighting the Northern 
48
 Rashid, Taliban, 50. 
49
 Ibid., 51. 
50
 Nojumi, "The Rise and Fall," 108. 
51
 Ibid., 109. 
15 
Alliance, comprised of Dostum, Ahmad Shah Masud, and various smaller resistance 
groups still functioning in Northern Afghanistan.52 Bureaucratic roles were often ignored 
for military ones, further isolating the Taliban leadership from the masses. As a result, the 
Taliban relied on controlling the Afghan people in cities and urban areas through a 
CO 
framework of "black versus white, virtue versus vice, Islamic versus un-Islamic." In the 
absence of bureaucratic and managerial skills, the Taliban relied on their idea of 
"puritanical morality" when formulating and implementing public policy.54 The Taliban's 
Islamic or un-Islamic, black and white approach to governance resulted in the absence of 
any public services or significant reconstruction projects. 
While the Taliban brought relative stability to a country embroiled in civil war 
and chaos since 1992, they were unable to sustain the administrative and bureaucratic 
elements necessary for a transitional government to be effective. When it came to the 
military conquest of Afghanistan, the Taliban established and executed a long-term plan 
in order to achieve their goals. However, much more sensitive questions regarding how 
the Taliban planned to rule Afghanistan and what they planned for the country's 
economic and social development were to remain permanently unanswered - even after 
the capture of Kabul.55 
al-Oaeda and the Fall of the Taliban: 
The Taliban's protracted war against the Northern Alliance resulted in a large 
number of casualties and high consumption of resources. "The continued resistance of the 
52
 Rashid, Taliban, 53. 
53




 Rashid, Taliban, 43. 
16 
Northern Alliance, combined with financial difficulties due to UN and U.S. embargos, 
made the Taliban desperate to produce human and capital resources."56 The Taliban 
relied heavily on drug trafficking between Afghanistan and Pakistan for revenue and 
weapons. By 1997, ninety-six per cent of Afghan heroin came from areas under Taliban 
control.57 Taxes on opium exports were the sole source of income fueling the Taliban's 
war economy. "In 1995 UNDCP estimated that Pakistan-Afghanistan drugs exports were 
earning some 50 billion rupees (US$1.35 billion) a year. By 1998 heroin exports had 
doubled in value to US$3billion."58 
For human resources, the Taliban found adequate supply from Osama Bin Laden 
and al-Qaeda. In 1996, Bin Laden and the base of al-Qaeda operations were expelled 
from Khartoum, Sudan under pressure from the United States and Saudi Arabia. Bin 
Laden returned to Afghanistan just as the Taliban had consolidated power over the 
majority of country. With the support of the Taliban, al-Qaeda grew to approximately 
5,000 members. Bin Laden himself became quite popular with the Taliban leadership 
and took pains to make sure he stayed in their good graces.60 Bin Laden paid for the 
construction of houses for Mullah Omar's family and other top Taliban leaders, provided 
funds for Taliban military equipment, and lent his own forces to fight alongside the 
Taliban in their continuing campaign against the Northern Alliance.61 Al-Qaeda's 
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military units were put on the front lines against Masud and the Northern Alliance. As 
fighting continued, the Taliban became more dependent on al-Qaeda's military and 
financial support.62 According to Nojumi, "By the end of 2000, al-Qaeda contributed 
around 30 percent to 40 percent of the Taliban's core military forces."63 Al-Qaeda's 
contributions to the Taliban military and the popularity of Bin Laden's international 
Islamist rhetoric made him a pivotal actor responsible for the Taliban's continued 
military success against the Northern Alliance. 
Bin Laden's relationship with top Taliban leaders eventually began to influence 
their policymaking. Until Bin Laden's arrival, the Taliban leadership were not 
particularly antagonistic to the United States or the West.64 However, with the prodding 
of Bin Laden and al-Qaeda, the Taliban became increasingly vociferous against the 
United States, the UN, Saudi Arabia and Muslim regimes around the world.65 Their 
statements increasingly reflected the "world view" and language of defiance that 
characterized Bin Laden and al-Qaeda.66 As the Taliban became more antagonistic 
through the persuasion of Bin Laden, the United States put pressure on the Taliban to 
have Bin Laden expelled. Unfortunately, the State Department and Mullah Omar were 
unable to come to terms on an agreement for Bin Laden's expulsion from Afghanistan, 
sending Bin Laden into hiding with the help of the Taliban in 1999. 
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After the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, U.S. led coalition forces, along 
with the Northern Alliance, launched Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. 
President George W. Bush stated that the intent of the operation was "to disrupt the use 
of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations" and bring terrorists to justice. General 
Tommy Franks, commander of military operations in Afghanistan, stated that the central 
mission in Operation Enduring Freedom was "the destruction of the al-Qaeda terrorist 
network and the removal of the Taliban leadership." By December, coalition forces 
controlled all major cities in Afghanistan including Mazar-e Sharif, Herat, Kandahar and 
Kabul. Soon after the military successes of coalition forces, the political and 
administrative structure of a post-Taliban Afghanistan was mapped out in Bonn, 
Germany. In what became known as the Bonn Agreement, various anti-Taliban Afghan 
groups met under UN auspices and agreed to convene an emergency Loya Jirga (grand 
assembly) by June 2002 to decide the electoral and constitutional proceedings of the 
country.70 Sixteen hundred delegates from around Afghanistan assembled and elected 
Hamid Karzai as their president. By December 2003, delegates of a Constitutional Loya 
Jirga approved a new constitution and opened the way for presidential election in October 
2004.71 
The Taliban Resurgence and the "neo-Taliban": 
After the initial successes of coalition forces in Afghanistan, and the ensuing 
political agreements laid out in Bonn; it seemed as if the Taliban and al-Qaeda were 
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vanquished within the blink of an eye and order would begin to be restored to a country 
embroiled in war and chaos since the Soviet invasion in 1979. However, the Taliban 
would prove to be more resilient than anticipated and began to regroup and consolidate 
their leadership within the tribal areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan as early as 2002. By 
2003, US estimates of insurgent Taliban fighters within Afghanistan ranged around 
1,000, a figure which expanded to 2-3,000 by 2004 and 3-4,000 by 2006.72 While exact 
numbers of Taliban fighters in Afghanistan and Pakistan are difficult to pin down due to 
seasonal mobilization of "part-time" fighters and varying rates of movement across 
borders, research estimates that Taliban insurgents numbered approximately 17,000 by 
2006.73 
After the invasion of coalition forces, the Taliban found refuge and were able to 
regroup in the same areas of Pakistan where they originally lived as refugees during the 
Soviet-Afghan war. Still controlled by the JUI - the same party that helped launch the 
Taliban in 1994 - the border provinces of Pakistan served as the epicenter for the 
resurgence of the Taliban.74 
Mullah Omar, who had been hiding out in Helmand province, arrived in Quetta, 
Pakistan in the winter of 2002. Taking key figures from the former regime to 
create a new Taliban Shura, Omar appointed four commanders to reorganize 
resistance in the four southern provinces of Afghanistan (Uruzgan, Helmand, 
Kandahar and Zabul).75 
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With backing from JUI-led provincial governments, Pakistani madrassas, and the 
clandestine support of the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the Taliban began to 
reorganize.7 
After stockpiling weapons, the Taliban launched their first guerilla attacks in the 
winter of 2002-3. They targeted the southern provinces of Kandahar, Zabul and Helmand. 
The Taliban also began targeting international aid workers and civilians. By autumn the 
Taliban had established almost complete control over Zabul and Helmand provinces and 
set up supply lines from Pakistan.77 All of this occurred while the United States and 
coalition forces were busy hunting Osama Bin Laden and carrying out the invasion of 
Iraq. 
By 2005, Western perceptions that the Taliban had been defeated began to 
change. Analysts such as Antonio Giustozzi focused their attention on the resurgence of 
the Taliban and the quiet, ongoing guerilla war being waged in Afghanistan. With the 
help of al-Qaeda, the Taliban dramatically improved their ambush tactics, their use of 
improvised explosive devices (lEDs) and suicide bombers became a regular feature of 
their arsenal.78 In 2006, the Taliban organized a broad offensive with the goal of re-
capturing Kandahar. Due to lack of troop presence in southern Afghanistan NATO forces 
resorted to excessive use of airpower and "sweep and clear" tactics in order to root out 
Taliban insurgents. These tactics antagonized local populations and turned them against 
NATO forces.79 The Taliban's attack on Kandahar in 2006, which organized thousands of 
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insurgents in battalion-sized units along with the logistical support of arms and 
ammunition, was a turning point in the Western perception of the Taliban and Pakistan.80 
It was now clear that the Taliban had not been "defeated," as previously thought, and that 
the Taliban had established a base of organization and operation within Pakistan. 
By 2007, The resurgent Taliban, or "neo-Taliban," established themselves as a 
formidable insurgency. The neo-Taliban developed innovative strategies and tactics. 
They even set up "sophisticated media outlets, which produced tens of thousands of 
DVDs and inspirational tapes[.. .]The Taliban now used web sites, FM radio stations and 
email, and their spokesmen gave interviews to journalists based in Pakistan."81 Constant 
and effective harassment by Taliban insurgents resulted in a U.S. troop surge in 2009, 
during which the Obama administration approved the deployment of 21,000 Marines to 
southern Afghanistan. By the time of presidential elections that same year, the Taliban 
controlled 164 out of 364 districts in Afghanistan.82 Voter "turnout was half that of the 
first presidential election in 2004, when it was 73 percent. There were 400 Taliban 
attacks on election day in which 26 people were killed and dozens more wounded - one 
of the worst days of violence in the country's history."83 Although the UN and NATO 
declared the elections a success, the successful attacks of the Taliban on election day 
combined with dismal voter turnout and rampant voter fraud were all stark reminders that 
the Taliban insurgency had developed into a serious problem. 





After almost a decade of military and political involvement in Afghanistan, the 
United States and its NATO allies continue to struggle to eliminate the "neo-Taliban" 
insurgency. Military and civilian researchers are still trying to define the variables which 
allowed the neo-Taliban to develop into such an effective fighting and recruiting force in 
the years following the Taliban's removal from power. With al-Qaeda's influence, the 
"peasant" led Taliban of the 1990s evolved into a sophisticated insurgency group 
"composed of hard-core jihadists who desire no compromise with the Americans or the 
Kabul regime. Some, like Mullah Omar, are wedded to the al-Qaeda philosophy of global 
jihad."84 Today the governments of Afghanistan and the United States are struggling to 
adopt an effective strategy which can eliminate all aspects of the neo-Taliban movement 
and restore stability to southern Afghanistan. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE ORIGINATION OF NEO-TALIBAN LITERATURE 
The Taliban rose to prominence out of the tribal and ethnic conflict that was left 
in the wake of Russia's withdrawal from Afghanistan in early 1989. Intellectual attention 
to the Taliban began after they consolidated control of most of Afghanistan and 
established a uniform government. Research such as Peter Marsden's "The Taliban: War 
and Religion in Afghanistan" and Ahmed Rashid's "Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and 
Fundamentalism in Central Asia" are two examples of analyses which thoroughly studied 
the Taliban movement since its beginning in the mid nineties. These studies help form the 
basis of our historical and anthropological understanding of the Taliban since the 1990's. 
However, after the fall of the Taliban in 2001, a new body of research emerged 
examining the Taliban's resurgence in the wake of Operation Enduring Freedom. Since 
the Afghan war, Taliban research includes counterinsurgency and insurgency theory, 
nation-building studies, international relations, and most importantly an understanding of 
who the Taliban really are and how they have evolved over the past decade. 
The "Neo-Taliban" Afghan insurgency, first coined by The Economist magazine 
in 200385, is relatively understudied when compared to the extensive body of literature 
regarding the original Taliban who appeared out of the Afghan civil war years of 1989-
5
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1993.86 Research on the post 2001 "neo-Taliban" seeks to answer three fundamental 
questions: who are the neo-Taliban; How have they organized a political and military 
insurgency; and how have they successfully competed for the hearts and minds of Afghan 
citizens? Scholars answer these questions in a number of different ways, each focusing on 
different causal factors. Studies on the Taliban, neo-Taliban and the Afghan insurgency 
can be separated into three major schools of thought based on distinct levels of analyses. 
These categories are broadly defined as the system or international level of analysis, 
including the regional level; the unit or state level of analysis; and the individual or sub-
state level of analysis. The following section explores the recent literature on the Taliban 
and Afghanistan according to a categorical approach based on levels of analysis. Finally, 
the literature review concludes with the proposed application of a "synthetic" approach to 
help better understand the neo-Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. 
Research of the Neo-Taliban and Afghanistan at the Individual Level of Analysis: 
Explaining the success of the neo-Taliban at the individual level of analysis 
provides an explanation of the complex ethnic, tribal, and religious makeup of 
Afghanistan. Unlike the Taliban of the mid-nineties, the neo-Taliban are not a 
"monolithic organization but one in which there are several interest groups."87 The 
original Taliban were Pashtun dominated, however the neo-Taliban's identity is not based 
on one ethnic group. Also, the Taliban of the nineties were motivated to fight because 
they wanted to unite Afghanistan under their interpretation of sharia. The neo-Taliban are 
86
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motivated by a myriad of reasons which cut across different religious, ideological, and 
geographic spectrums. 
While the majority of hard-core Taliban88 still identify Mullah Omar as their 
leader, the critical reasons why many insurgents continue to support the Taliban has little 
to do with Taliban leadership, ideology or ethnic/tribal motivations.89 The neo-Taliban 
continue to refer to themselves as Taliban and have sought alliance and support with 
hardcore Taliban because it elicits power, fear, and unity in many Afghans.90 Current 
research stresses that we must continue to analyze the makeup of today's Taliban and 
label them as neo-Taliban in order to reflect the complex and fractional nature of the 
insurgency.91 Most importantly, as research on the Taliban and neo-Taliban continues, 
scholars identify new motives for insurgents which further illustrates the complex and 
constantly evolving nature of the neo-Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. 
Taliban and neo-Taliban insurgents fight for different reasons; however they have 
a common enemy in the occupying Western forces and the perceived "puppet" Afghan 
government. Traditional Taliban insurgents aim to overthrow the new Afghan 
government in order to re-impose their radical interpretation of Sunni Islam.92 The 
Taliban are joined by neo-Taliban insurgents who are motivated by enumerable reasons: 
88
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to expand al-Qaeda's international terrorist network, hatred of occupying forces and local 
government, need for income, safety, and fear. Due to the variety of motivational factors, 
much confusion surrounds the identity of the opposition in Afghanistan. According to 
Amin Tarzi, there is not much evidence of "an umbrella organization or a centralized 
body directing activities, but instead several independent groups loosely linked by their 
drive to oust the foreign forces in order to establish their own strongholds of power." 
The heterogeneity of neo-Taliban insurgents at the individual level makes the 
establishment of an accurate explanatory model almost impossible. Additionally, much of 
the data collected regarding Taliban motivations is unreliable due to fears of Taliban 
retaliation.94 Reliable data suggest that the vast majority of Afghans do not want the 
Taliban to return to power and the insurgency does not include a huge amount of the 
populace.95 The individual level of analysis provides the least amount of comprehensive 
analysis to help explain the success of the neo-Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. 
The State Level of Analysis and the Afghan Insurgency: 
Scholarship on the Afghan insurgency and the neo-Taliban focuses heavily on 
variables at the state level of analysis. State-level analyses tend to address two major 
categories when explaining the success of the neo-Taliban. First, scholars attribute much 
of the neo-Taliban's success to mounting frustration and widespread corruption in Afghan 
government institutions at national and local levels, and at the continuing lack of basic 
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services.96 Second, scholars such as Antonio Giustozzi, Seth Jones, and Roland Paris 
focus on analyzing counterinsurgency and insurgency strategy and policy. This approach 
argues that the success of the neo-Taliban can be explained by analyzing the inadequacies 
of NATO's various counterinsurgency strategies and the success of the neo-Taliban's 
"hearts and minds" tactics.97 Both state-level approaches focus on the goals of specific 
groups whose main objectives are to consolidate power within Afghanistan's borders, 
thus largely removing them from the international arena. 
Insurgency/Counterinsurgency Approach: 
An insurgency/counterinsurgency perspective on the Afghan insurgency helps 
explain the success and the motivations of the neo-Taliban from a strategic perspective. 
In his book "In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan," Seth Jones 
analyzes the structure of counterinsurgency movements and what motivates insurgents to 
fight. While Jones' research takes into account regional and international perspectives, his 
analysis focuses on interpreting historical data and insurgency theory. Jones defines four 
principal actors in insurgencies. First, the insurgents, those hoping to overthrow the 
established national government or secede from it. In Afghanistan's case, insurgent 
forces are comprised of the remnants of the Taliban, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-i-
OS 
Islami, al Qaida, and other foreign fighters. The second set of actors in the Afghan 
insurgency are the local government, which includes the government's security forces, 
the army and the police, as well as key national and local political institutions.99 The third 
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group consists of "external states and other non-state entities, which might support either 
side. Outside actors can tip the balance of war in favor of either insurgents or the 
government, but they can rarely win it for either side."100 Jones identifies the external 
actors in Afghanistan as the United States, NATO forces, and the United Nations -
supporting the Afghan government - and the international jihadi network and some 
individuals from neighboring states, such as Pakistan and Iran - supporting the 
insurgency. 
The last group of actors in an insurgency are the local population. Jones argues 
that this group is the most important because "it is for their hearts and minds that the war 
is being fought in the first place."101 Essentially it is the insurgent's job to propagate their 
message and separate the population from the government and its external forces while at 
the same time fighting and eluding the police and military. If insurgents manage to do 
this, Jones argues, and if they are able to acquire the active or passive support of the 
people, they are more likely to win the war.102 In the end, the successful exercise of 
political power by the neo-Taliban depends on "the tacit or explicit agreement of the 
population - or, at worst, on its submissiveness."103 Insurgencies are extremely complex 
conflicts that depend on both material and ideological dominance in order for one side to 
prevail. 
The strategy of neo-Taliban insurgents is outlined by Paris as "a sophisticated 
political-military strategy aimed at undermining confidence in the Karzai government 
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through guerilla attacks on military and civilian targets, while at the same time offering 
ordinary Afghans an alternative government in the form of religious justice."104 This 
describes the neo-Taliban's strategy since reappearing in 2001, and they are very 
successful in its execution. NATO counterinsurgency strategy, on the other hand, is not 
so steadfast. Policy analysis by Giustozzi, Jones, and others reveals disagreement among 
NATO allies regarding counterinsurgency strategy and describes the ad-hoc 
implementation of multiple, sometimes conflicting counterinsurgency strategies by 
uncoordinated NATO forces.105 Research on counterinsurgency strategy shows that 
NATO is ineffective at eliminating the spread of the neo-Taliban through military means. 
Governmental Approach: 
Research at the state level also suggests that state governance has a large impact 
on Afghan counterinsurgency strategy. Insurgencies are, to a large extent, a waiting 
game.106 In order to win the game, you need effective governance that can combat the 
encroachment of insurgency-administered justice. By 2006 the neo-Taliban established 
such deep roots in Afghanistan and Pakistan that they believed they were strong enough 
militarily and politically to outlast Western forces in the long run. According to Ahmed 
Rashid, 
As long as the Karzai government failed to govern effectively or provide services 
and jobs to the people, as long as it allowed corruption and drug trafficking to 
take place under its very nose, the Taliban were winning by default. The failure of 
the government to provide quick and effective justice to the people only further 
helped the Taliban cause.107 
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Corruption in government has been a red flag for researchers and correlates well with the 
continued spread of neo-Taliban influence. 
Corruption and ineffectiveness in the Afghan government and the rise of neo-
Taliban popularity is usually explained in two ways by researchers. One approach 
focuses on analyzing corruption within government institutions and the other approach 
addresses the deficiencies of the institutions themselves. The first approach, supported by 
Roland Paris, Seth Jones and Ahmed Rashid, argues that widespread corruption within 
Karzai's government forced Afghan citizens to turn to insurgent-sponsored governmental 
programs for basic needs.109 In 2007, Lieutenant General Eikenberry linked government 
ineffectiveness and corruption with the success of neo-Taliban recruiting: 
"The Long-term threat to campaign success, thought, is the potential irretrievable 
loss of legitimacy of the Government of Afghanistan. If the Afghan government is 
unable to counter population frustration with the lack of progress in reform and 
national development, the Afghan people may lose confidence in the nature of 
their political system.' The result, he cautioned, would be a point 'at which the 
Government of Afghanistan becomes irrelevant to its people, and the goal of 
establishing a democratic, moderate, self-sustaining state could be lost 
forever.'"110 
Analyst Seth Jones describes corruption and incompetence as a "cancer" in the Afghan 
government. Jones outlines three major categories of corruption specific to Afghanistan: 
drug trafficking, bribery among senior officials, and pervasive extortion among Afghan 
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police and judges.111 Jones' research also concludes that "Afghanistan's insurgency was 
caused by a supply of disgruntled villagers unhappy with their government^..]The 
existence of a weak and ineffectual government was a critical precondition to the rise of 
violence in Afghanistan."112 The perceived failure and corruption of Afghanistan's 
government is one of the most important variables explaining the neo-Taliban's 
motivation to fight. 
Research on the effects of corrupt and inadequate governance are supported by 
studies from the United Nations, the European Union, the Afghan government, and the 
U.S. government.113 Consensus among these studies finds that the appointment of 
unprofessional, corrupt and ineffective government officials, especially at local levels, 
reduced the trust and confidence of the Afghan people, making them easy prey for the 
neo-Taliban's anti-government propaganda. Jones points out that in 2006, the 
interrogation of more than 100 neo-Taliban fighters by the U.S. military concluded: "the 
critical reasons why [insurgent] fighters support the Taliban had little to do with religious 
ideology. Rather, they had to do with bad government and economics. The government 
could not protect them or deliver services, and they were often simply paid better by the 
Taliban."115 Unlike the Afghan government, the Taliban rely on opium cultivation, 
production, and trafficking for almost all of their funding needs.116 In 2008, the United 
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Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) released a survey which estimates that the 
Taliban and other anti-government forces earned $250-470 million of income from 
opium farming and trafficking.117 
The second governance-based approach used to explain the accelerated rise of the 
neo-Taliban focuses on the structure of the Afghan government and its implementation. 
In "Defining Success in Afghanistan," Biddle et al argues that many of the failings of the 
Afghan government are due to the administration's hastily organized, top-down 
implementation of a Western-style democracy which is incompatible with the Afghan 
state. Also popular among neo-Taliban literature is a critique of the failed implementation 
of "Western," centralized democracy in Afghanistan. Jones argues that the top-down 
approach to centralized government in Afghanistan only secured control of small, urban 
areas and restricted the capabilities of the government to a select portion of the 
population. He describes the style of centralized government in Afghanistan as the 
country's "fatal flaw," concluding -- along with the majority of other researchers — that 
for the Afghan government to outlast the neo-Taliban, they need to focus on "going 
1 1 0 
local." Unfortunately, the policy proposals for going local and creating an Afghan 
government with both local and national representation are equally as general and vague 
as the calls for anti-corruption measures. 
Rashid argues that the Afghan government will never be effective until NATO 
and Afghan officials deal with poverty, economic malaise, education, and joblessness 
116
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among the populations of both Afghanistan and Pakistan.119 Jones suggests the 
establishment of well-coordinated tribal engagement strategy and other bottom-up 
approaches.120 Biddle et al suggest a process of decentralization and "mixed sovereignty" 
in order to accommodate the numerous political needs of Afghanistan's rural and tribal 
populations.121 Tarzi proposes incorporating "moderate Taliban" into the political system, 
eradicating criminal networks, and cutting off foreign lifelines to insurgents.122 The range 
of opinions among neo-Taliban and Afghanistan scholars illustrates how difficult it is to 
come to a consensus on how to solve the governance dilemma. 
Insurgency strategy and institutional analysis at the state level help explain the 
rise and success of the neo-Taliban and illustrates many of the specific problems within 
the Afghan government and among the coalition allies meant to help defend and 
reconstruct the Afghan state. However, this level of analysis has difficulty including the 
Taliban in an international context, let alone a regional one. Additionally, the state level 
of analysis runs the risk of over-simplifying the Afghan government and the neo-Taliban, 
opting to describe each as a homogeneous group with established, agreed upon goals. 
Afghanistan, Insurgency, and the Regional Level of Analysis: 
Scholars such as Peter Marsden, Ahmed Rashid, Neamatollah Nojumi and 
Nasreen Akhtar analyze the rise of the neo-Taliban and the Afghan insurgency from the 
international and regional levels of analysis. These scholars focus heavily on the dynamic 
histories and relationships between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the United States. In 2001, 
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the task of rebuilding Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban was delegated among 
various states and state-run international organizations. The United States, NATO, and a 
larger international coalition has a United Nations mandate to reconstruct the Afghan 
state.123 Researchers such as Ahmed Rashid and Nasreen Akhtar argue that the best way 
to understand the rise of the neo-Taliban and the Afghan insurgency is to study the power 
dynamics between the international actors involved in the reconstruction of 
Afghanistan.124 Most important among these actors are those with the most at stake in 
Afghanistan politically and economically — the United States and Pakistan. 
Regional analysis by scholars suggests that the successful resurgence of the neo-
Taliban in 2001, along with the successful rise of the Taliban in 1996, can be traced back 
to the influence of one state actor, Pakistan.125 During the Taliban's rise, Pakistan's 
government and military equipped, trained, financed, and guided the Taliban struggle in 
order to advance its own interests.126 Those interests, according to Akhtar, were defined 
broadly as the support of the Taliban movement in order to checkmate its regional rivals 
and keep itself in a position of greater influence than others in the region, specifically 
India.127 According to Rashid, one of the foremost scholars on relations between 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, the seven tribal areas in northern Pakistan known as the 
Federal Administered Tribal Agencies (FATA) served as the initial staging grounds of 
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the Taliban resurgence.128 Using historical analysis, scholars such as Akhtar, Rashid, and 
Marsden argue that support for the Taliban during the 1990's cemented ethnic, religious, 
and political ties which would allow the defeated Taliban leadership of 2001 a place of 
refuge and a geographical headquarters from which stage a resurgence within 
199 
Afghanistan. 
Finding a way to close the porous borders between Afghanistan and Pakistan is a 
pivotal objective in the fight against the neo-Taliban in Afghanistan.130 The international 
school of thought also helps explain why the neo-Taliban were able to take refuge in 
Pakistan, and why Pakistan continues to be a base of operation for the neo-Taliban 
insurgency in Afghanistan today. Akhtar and Nojumi argue that the Pakistani 
government's support for the Taliban over the years made it the sole international 
stakeholder concerned with the Taliban's success or failure. Thus Pakistani officials 
largely turned a blind eye to the arrival of Taliban fighters within the FATA.131 
Continued indifference by Pakistani officials towards Taliban refugees and documented 
refusal of officials to apprehend or report Taliban personnel living in Pakistan has further 
shaped relations and discourses between Pakistan, the United States, and Afghanistan 
1 ^9 
regarding the conflict. Rashid concludes that "the lack of trust between the Pakistani 
military and the US government helped fuel the revival of the Taliban movement."133 
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The strength of the regional perspective's explanation of the neo-Taliban's rise is 
the fact that it contextualizes the Afghan insurgency within a regional power dynamic. 
The research of scholars like Rashid and Akhtar brings attention to the volatile 
international environment in which Afghanistan is being reconstructed. Researchers 
remind us that successful state-building efforts in Afghanistan are contingent, in part, on 
the "positive involvement of all state actors that have the capacity to influence its internal 
politics and security[...]At the moment, Afghanistan's neighbor Pakistan is playing a 
crucial role with American forces and NATO. Pakistan is fighting a war against terrorism 
on behalf of the U.S. administration."134 However, the international perspective can 
overlook specific actors at the state and individual levels which better explain why neo-
Taliban militants fight, who they are, and who should be developing an effective strategy 
to combat them. 
Concluding Thoughts On the State of Neo-Taliban Literature: 
The literature reviewed helps identify the different actors that make up the neo-
Taliban and their motivations for opposing the Afghan government and NATO forces. 
Each level of analysis provides important information regarding the conflict in 
Afghanistan. The regional, state, and individual perspectives of Afghanistan and the neo-
Taliban show that the neo-Taliban insurgency is not occurring in a historical or political 
vacuum. Every actor involved in the conflict, whether they are part of the Taliban, the 
Afghan government, or NATO are operating within an international environment. The 
major weakness of the international explanatory model is the absence of a theoretical 
application which helps structure the dynamics of the conflict according to international 
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relations norms. In order to better understand the neo-Taliban in an international context, 
this analysis proposes a unique theoretical approach which combines elements of the state 
and sub-state dynamics of the neo-Taliban in a way which does not ignore the structure 
of the international environment in which the neo-Taliban exist. 
Accurately explaining the neo-Taliban, Afghan insurgency requires combining 
variables at the individual, state, regional, and international levels of analysis. It is 
necessary to consolidate these variables into one theoretical framework in order to gain a 
better understanding of the structural dynamics and discourses which shape this conflict. 
In an effort to enhance the field of neo-Taliban literature, this analysis will apply 
Cornelia Beyer's "Synthetic Approach," — which she uses to explain international 
terrorism in the Middle East — to the neo-Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. Applying 
Beyer's synthetic approach to the neo-Taliban and Afghanistan will illustrate the complex 
relationships between state and non-state actors currently involved in Afghanistan, their 
power dynamics, and the ideological discourses which structure their relationships. 
Beyer's article, Hegemony, Equilibrium and Counterpower: A Synthetic 
Approach uses international terrorism as an illustration to examine the effects of U.S. 
hegemony in "mind and matter" on the Middle East.135 Beyer believes that in order for 
International Relations to progress, key tenets of structural realism and constructivism 
must be combined to form a synthetic theoretical approach. Beyer's framework rests on 
several key principles. First, in accordance with influential realist theoretician Kenneth 
Waltz, that the international system is configured according to material polarity. Material 
polarity refers to the idea that a state's domination is based on material factors such as 
135
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gross domestic product, military power, natural resources, arms, and population.136 
Beyer's synthetic approach to explaining international terrorism is first contingent on the 
idea that the world is unipolar, with the United States able to exert the most political, 
economic and military power throughout the world.137 Beyer believes that it is the United 
States' powerful "material factors," that allow it to dominate internationally. 
However, Beyer adds that "it is not only material factors that can explain US 
dominance in international affairs, ideational factors also have to be considered, as a tool 
and resource of power."138 The United States has the most material power according to 
realists, but it also has the most ideational power in some regions of the world, 
constructivists would argue, making it a regional hegemon. 
Hegemony implies more than just having preponderant material capabilities at 
one's disposal; additional factors also play a role, such as the capacity to exercise 
power based on material capabilities, and 'soft power' or ideological power, 
meaning the capability to change others' behavior by influencing their belief 
system, their way of thinking, and even their rationality.139 
In order to "understand the multidimensional reality of US predominance," Beyer 
argues we must reconcile realist and constructivist approaches into one, synthetic 
theoretical framework. This is possible, Beyer posits, because the ideational and the 
material are intrinsically linked and partly interdependent.140 Beyer's proof lies in the 
belief that human affairs are structured by both material and ideational factors. 
136
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For material change to occur, ideas have to be expressed in creative or destructive 
action. Humans therefore act as the creators of ideas and as the mediators between 
ideas and the material. Regarded by realists as material facts (population) and in 
constructivism as bearers of ideas (agents), humans operate in both dimensions, 
able to transform the ideational into the material, and vice versa.141 
According to this view, ideas are needed for creating and changing material facts, which 
are represented in matter (infrastructure, government buildings, the police, the media, 
etc).142 Essentially, nothing—except the original conditions of nature which existed before 
human life—can exist without preceding ideas, which are the catalysts for altering 
material in a creative or destructive manner. The United States, Beyer concludes is the 
most dominant state in both the ideational (its discourse and ideology) and material (its 
economy, armaments) dimensions. US hegemony, therefore, rests on material 
foundations but was created and is maintained via the promotion of ideas.143 
Beyer goes on to apply the logic of her synthetic approach to help explain 
international terrorism in the Middle East. According to Waltz, unipolarity in the 
international system naturally leads to counter-balancing in an attempt to return the 
"balance of power" in relations between nations. In the Middle East, especially in a 
country such as Afghanistan with few natural resources and a government of elites 
approved by the United States, there are no counter-balancing forces present to resist the 
hegemonic imposition of US material and ideational dominance. Terrorism, therefore, is 
a result of the absence of a tendency towards equilibrium at the state level.145 Logically, 
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if insufficient balancing occurs at the state level, actors at the sub-state level compensate 
by using terrorism or insurgency to balance foreign intervention and the spread of 
ideological or cultural influence that not all Middle Eastern populations approve of.146 
Conceptualizing, Defining, and Measuring the "Synthetic Approach": 
Cornelia Beyer's synthetic approach to explaining the rise of international 
terrorism in Hegemony, Equilibrium and Counterpower utilizes a combination of several 
key components of international relations theory. This analysis will use Beyer's 
theoretical foundation in order to gain a better understand of the neo-Taliban's complex 
makeup and the Afghan insurgency in an international context. Beyer's synthetic 
approach combines key elements of realism and constructivism into two major pillars of 
thought. Within the first pillar, Beyer merges the realist interpretations of unipolarity in 
the international system with the constructivist idea of hegemony. The combination of 
these two frameworks creates what Beyer describes as hegemony in mind and matter or 
"thick hegemony."147 Thick hegemony helps explain how power is distributed 
throughout the international system according to both material (realism) and ideational 
(constructivism) considerations. Within the second pillar, Beyer uses realism's balance-
of-power model and a constructivist interpretation of "tendency towards equilibrium" to 
explain the shifting power constellations among states both regionally and 
internationally. 
Understanding and accurately measuring the power of state and sub-state actors 
according to their capabilities requires the consideration of both material factors 
(population, territory, resource endowment, economic capability) and nonmaterial factors 
146
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(political stability and competence).148 Beyer's synthetic approach encourages measuring 
material and non-material considerations in conjunction with one another when trying to 
determine the power and influence of state and non-state actors. In the context of the 
Afghan war and Taliban insurgency, a synthetic approach enhances our understanding of 
the complex distribution of power among major state and sub-state actors and offers 
comprehensive explanations to questions regarding the ongoing military insurgency in 
Afghanistan and the country's uncertain future. In order to apply these frameworks to the 
neo-Taliban and Afghanistan, several additional terms must be defined and measured. 
Polarity and Hegemony: 
Beyer's analysis rests on the idea that the United States is arguably the sole 
superpower in a unipolar system. Many realist scholars, most notably Kenneth Waltz, 
believe that the structure of the international system is best defined in terms of 
distribution of power.149 A state's "power" is traditionally determined through the 
measurement of its resources and capabilities. The resources and capabilities of a state 
are factors such as the measure of its population, technological capabilities, territory, 
resource endowment, economic capability, and military might.150 These strictly material 
factors are then measured relationally among important international actors in order to 
determine "poles of power."151 Essentially, this process establishes a formula to measure 
the international system's configuration in order to determine the center(s) of domination 
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and the number of dominating states.152 Using this formula, Waltz -with the support of 
additional scholarship153 — argues that unipolarity is a global reality.154 
In order to adapt Beyer's analysis to Afghanistan, this study will forego Beyer's 
dependence on a unipolar interpretation and instead apply the logic of Samuel 
Huntington's uni-multipolar system. Opposed to a unipolar system, where one 
superpower could effectively resolve important international issues alone, and no 
combination of other states would have the power to prevent it from doing so; 
Huntington's uni-multipolar system argues that solving key international issues in today's 
world requires the leadership of a superpower (the United States) but always with some 
combination of other major states.155 Huntington argues that the United States is at the 
apex of the uni-multipolar system and has the power to promote its interests in "virtually 
every part of the world."156 On the second tier of the uni-multipolar echelon are major 
regional powers that are preeminent in certain areas of the world but are unable to extend 
their interests and capabilities as globally as the United States. One example of a regional 
power is Pakistan in Southern Asia.157 Finally, at the third level are secondary regional 
powers whose interests often conflict with the more powerful regional states.158 In 
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Afghanistan, these third-level actors can be separated into two major groups. The first 
group is made up of the Afghan national government and any pro-government Afghan 
forces. The second group includes any anti-Government or anti-NATO forces, including 
the Taliban, neo-Taliban insurgents, and al-Qaeda. This analysis will apply Huntington's 
uni-multipolar approach to polarity in Afghanistan because it takes into consideration 
each actor's role in the conflict while still remaining within the theoretical confines of 
polarity, realism, and constructivism. 
In order to better understand how the United States' position as the only regional 
(and to some extent global) superpower affects its ability to achieve its goals in 
Afghanistan requires more than just an understanding of material factors. A 
comprehensive understanding of U.S. capabilities in Afghanistan and Southern Asia must 
also combine the "ideational" or ideological factors that the United States uses as tools of 
power in the Middle East. Research supporting U.S. hegemony is extensive and well 
established.159 Combining the idea of hegemony with polarity adds a dimension of 
understanding that goes beyond just material considerations. 
Hegemony implies more than just having preponderant material capabilities at 
one's disposal; additional factors also play a role, such as the capacity to exercise 
power based on material capabilities, and 'soft power' or ideological power, 
meaning the capability to change others' behavior by influencing their belief 
system, their way of thinking, and even their rationality.160 
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Antonio Gramsci, a social scientist who pioneered the concept of hegemony, 
described it as "the additional power, beyond domination, that accrues to a dominant 
group by it convincing subordinate groups that its rule serves not only its own interests 
but also those of the sub-ordinate groups."161 Hegemony is measured through the 
domination of a state's discourse and ideology. The ideational hegemony of the United 
States includes the promulgation of ideology such as free market economy, capitalism, 
consumerism, democracy, and freedom. The power and prominence of these ideas in 
domestic and international politics combined with the dominant material power of the 
United States form what Beyer calls "thick hegemony." "US hegemony, then, rests on 
material foundations, but was created and is maintained via the promotion of ideas."162 
The analytical framework of this research seeks to determine levels of hegemony in 
Afghanistan and Southeast Asia through a synthesis of material and ideational power. 
Understanding who the most powerful actors are in Afghanistan and what their interests 
are is essential for answering the main question of this research: why does the Taliban 
insurgency still exist after 10 years of occupation and nation-building? 
Balance of Power and Equilibrium: 
A synthetic analysis of the impact of hegemony in mind and matter on the Afghan 
insurgency and the Taliban requires the explanation of several more theoretical concepts. 
Balance of power and equilibrium are two powerful ideas in international relations which 
explain how and why states compete and cooperate with one another for international 
power. Waltz argues that unipolarity leads to counter-balancing by groups of weaker 
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states in order to restore the international "balance of power, which is most stable in a 
bipolar constellation.163 According to Waltz, "In an asymmetric constellation, the weaker 
power will balance against the stronger one; and symmetric powers will also balance 
against each other, but not if they can coalesce - align with each other, or bandwagon -
with a stronger one, against a dominating power."164 Tendency towards equilibrium, 
described by balance of power politics, is assumed to be a rational outcome based on the 
competitive nature of states and the state of anarchy which international relations 
exists.165 
Constructivism, on the other hand, would attribute transformations among state 
relations to changes in the "underlying logic of interaction into a social, other-regarding 
one."166 Alexander Wendt argues that our understanding of the international system 
should include an appreciation of how the mechanics of "dyadic, triadic, and n-actor 
interaction shape and are in turn shaped by 'stocks of knowledge' that collectively 
constitute identities and interests and, more broadly, constitute the structures of 
international life." The constructivist perspective explains changes in international 
balance of power by focusing on the reasons why states accept or oppose asymmetric and 
symmetric conditions and why they abstain or initiate balancing procedures according to 
changes in internal ideas and norms. 
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Combining constructivist and realist perceptions of balance of power and 
equilibrium allows consideration of both state and sub-state level variables more 
coherently. Wendt, Beyer and other analysts advocate the need for a synthetic use of 
international relations theory in order for the field to progress as a whole. According to 
Wendt: 
Statism need not be bound by realist ideas about what 'state' must mean. State 
identities and interests can be collectively transformed within an anarchic context 
by many factors—individual, domestic, systemic, or transnational—and as such 
are an important dependent variable. Such a reconstruction of state-centric 
international theory is necessary if we are to theorize adequately about the 
emerging forms of transnational political identity that sovereign states will help 
bring into being. To the extent, I hope that statism, like the state, can be 
historically progressive. 
Following in Wendt and Beyer's theoretical footsteps, this analysis builds on the concept 
of a "synthetic" approach to international relations theory by applying realist and 
constructivist frameworks to analyze the Taliban and the Afghan insurgency. The 
relevant concepts for realist and constructivist thought, as they apply to this analysis, 
have been categorized and defined in this section and will be utilized throughout the 
subsequent analysis to contribute to the growing field of research which strives to better 
understand the neo-Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. 
Wendt, "Anarchy is What State make of it," 424-425. 
CHAPTER III 
APPLYING THE SYNTHETIC APPROACH TO AFGHANISTAN AND THE NEO-
TALIBAN 
The Taliban regime in Afghanistan officially came to an end in early December, 
2001. By mid-2006, the Taliban's surviving leadership, along with neo-Taliban recruits 
had established areas of control in the Southern and Eastern provinces of Afghanistan, 
from which they launched significant attacks. In December 2009, President Obama 
announced a "surge" of 30,000 troops to Afghanistan to stabilize the countryside. Since 
then, U.S. and U.K. publicly announced a tentative withdrawal from Afghanistan by 
2015. On June 22nd, President Obama announced his plan to withdraw all 33,000 
members of the "surge" by 2012.169 The war in Afghanistan has been going on longer 
than World War Two and Vietnam. As of June 7th, 2010 the Afghan War is the longest 
war in US history.170 According to many analysts, securing Afghanistan is no longer 
about removing the Taliban from power or defeating al-Qaeda through military means; 
the future of a stable, democratic Afghanistan and a successful NATO withdrawal are 
now political problems.171 Extending the ideas of power, polarity, equilibrium, thick 
hegemony, and the mutuality of both ideas and material facts to the Taliban and the 
"A gamble that may not pay off," The Economist, June 25th-July 1st, 2011, 16. 
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Afghan insurgency helps explain the complex dynamics underlying the ongoing conflict 
and why NATO forces have not been able to remove the Taliban. 
The Afghan Insurgency and the Uni-Multipolar System: 
Interpreting the Afghan war according to Huntington's uni-multipolar system 
creates a unique way to look at the ongoing Taliban insurgency. As previously 
mentioned, the major actors involved in the Afghan war include global, regional, and 
local "poles" of power. These actors span across three levels. At the first level is the 
United States, a major superpower and a state actor which wishes to have the most 
influence in Afghanistan both materially and ideologically. At the second level is 
Pakistan, the only major regional power that is heavily invested in the future of 
Afghanistan. At the third level are secondary powers which either support the Afghan 
national government and the United States or align themselves with Taliban and neo-
Taliban insurgents in order to resist US-led domination in the region. Examining how 
these actors interact and interpret their roles in Afghanistan and the wider region helps us 
understand the ongoing insurgency in Afghanistan in terms of power, hegemony, and 
equilibrium. 
Huntington argues that in a uni-multipolar system, the residing superpower would 
prefer the emergence of a unipolar system in which it is the sole hegemon and often acts 
as if such a system exists.17 The other powers, however, "would prefer a multi-polar 
system in which they could pursue their interests, unilaterally and collectively, without 
being subject to constraints, coercion, and pressure by the stronger superpower."173 In 
Huntington, "Lonely Superpower," 37. 
Afghanistan, relations between the United States, the Afghan government, Pakistan, and 
sub-state actors follows this exact trajectory. As one of the world's few superpowers, the 
United States often acts unilaterally to achieve its goals. America's unilateral tendencies 
are constantly illustrated by cross border drone strikes in Pakistan and most recently with 
the killing of Osama bin-Laden inside Pakistan without the Pakistani government's 
cooperation, consent, or knowledge.174 Unilateral actions by the United States in 
Afghanistan and the region intimidate and anger Pakistan, the Afghan government, and 
sometimes even NATO allies.175 
The current uni-multipolar system in Afghanistan and Pakistan is devolving into a 
situation where second and third level actors such as Pakistan and the Afghan 
government feel threatened by what they see as the American pursuit of regional 
hegemony through unilateral means. For every multilateral success involving the 
cooperation of Afghan, NATO, and Pakistani forces, there is an opposite, unilateral 
action that not all sides agree is in their best interest. None of the principal power-
wielders in Afghanistan are happy with the current status quo, and as long as the United 
States acts as if it were a unipolar hegemon in Afghanistan, without the consent or 
collaboration of the Afghan or Pakistani governments, cooperation and support will erode 
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as regional, state, and sub-state actors increasingly assert themselves to promote their 
177 
own interests. 
The next sections of this analysis employ some of the main concepts of 
Huntington's view of polarity and Beyer's synthetic approach in order to further 
understand the uni-multipolar power constellations within Afghanistan and the region and 
how these power relationships affect the neo-Taliban insurgency. Ultimately, the goal of 
adapting the synthetic approach and the idea of polarity to Afghanistan is to provide 
alternative explanations for the continued rise of the Taliban and neo-Taliban and the 
reasons for their resilience and determination. 
Power Equilibrium, the United States, Afghanistan, and Pakistan: 
According to Waltz's interpretation of polarity, balancing between states takes 
place in unequal relationships of power. The power relationship between the states of 
the Southeast Asia — especially Afghanistan — and the United States is highly unequal, so 
balancing is expected. Comparing material indicators shows that Afghanistan and 
surrounding countries, such as Pakistan, are significantly weaker than the United States 
and its Western allies in military, economic, and technologic terms, with declining 
179 
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These values would lead us to believe that the states of the Middle East and Southeast 
Asia, especially Afghanistan and Pakistan, would both oppose and try to balance the 
United States in order to assert their power and achieve their own interests.181 "Attempts 
to balance US power in the region "should take the form of regional integration in the 
Middle East, while seeking alignment specifically with China, and also with Russia." 
However, as Beyer points out, with the exceptions of Iran and Syria, there is little sign of 
such balancing among Middle Eastern and South Asian states. 
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The explanations as to why power balancing at the state level is largely absent in 
Afghanistan can be grouped into two major categories. The first and most evident 
explanations relate to the US removal of Afghanistan's state apparatus — the Taliban — 
and facilitation of the creation of a centralized democracy through the Bonn Agreement. 
The second group of explanations deals directly with Pakistan and helps explain the 
dynamic political relations between the United States, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakistan 
and the ISI invested significant amounts of money and training in Afghan development 
and Afghan militant movements since the mujahedeen began fighting the Soviet Union in 
1979.183 Pakistan's cooperation with the United States at the beginning of Operation 
Enduring Freedom marked a turning point in their relationship with Afghanistan and the 
Taliban. Afghanistan's only regional ally fell in step with the United States at the 
beginning of the war, widening a power void which would eventually be filled by 
elements of the Taliban insurgency. 
Pakistan's role and allegiances within the uni-multipolar world of Southeast Asia 
have changed over time depending on fluid, sometimes conflicting interests. Before 
September 11th, Pakistan overtly supported the Taliban through the nation's spy agency, 
the Interservices Intelligence Agency (ISI). Economic and military support between 
Afghan militants and the ISI dates back to the Soviet-Afghan war, when the ISI trained 
and outfitted many mujahedeen fighters within Pakistan and sent them across the border 
to combat Soviet forces with new tactics and weaponry.184 When the Taliban came to 
183
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power in the late 1990s, the ISI targeted them for support because they were the only 
group strong enough to fight against the warlords of the Northern Alliance, who 
controlled Northern Afghanistan and received financial and military support from 
Pakistan's regional rival, India.185 The regional power struggle between India and 
Pakistan played a large part in the alliance of the ISI and the Taliban, and it would be 
regional power shifts which would break them apart in 2001. 
Days after September 11th, 2001 President Bush announced that America was at 
war with international terrorists and declared a state of emergency.186 On September 15th 
Pakistan's president, Pervez Musharraf was "given an ultimatum by President Bush ('you 
are either with us or against us'), and the military regime immediately decided to switch 
sides, from helping the Taliban to supporting the US invasion of Afghanistan that would 
destroy it."187 Once again, Pakistan's decision was guided by regional power dynamics. 
The major reason for acquiescing to the United States' demands, Musharraf stated, was 
that any other response could have led to "the bombing of Pakistan, threats to its nuclear 
facilities, and the creation of US military bases in neighboring India, Pakistan's long-
standing enemy."188 Since 2001, different actors among the military, the government, and 
the ISI appeared to pursue a dual track of condemning and hunting the Taliban on one 
1 RQ 
hand and clandestinely supporting them on the other. This sparked extensive debate in 
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Western and domestic media about whether Pakistan's President Perves Musharraf was 
committed to defeating the Taliban insurgency.190 
The debate has two major standpoints, some claiming that Musharraf was not in 
control or aware of ISI support for the Taliban and others arguing that Musharraf was no 
longer interested in the stability of the Karzai regime, thus allowing and maybe even 
supporting Taliban elements within Pakistan.191 Today Pakistan faces a new barrage of 
questions and doubts from Western sources after the location and killing of Osama bin-
Laden within their borders and Pakistan's subsequent denial of any knowledge of bin-
1 99 
Laden's whereabouts previous to the American raid. Bin Laden's ability to hide in 
Pakistan is a perfect illustration of the inability of Pakistani officials to control unwanted 
elements within their own state borders. For many reasons, Pakistan and Afghanistan do 
not function like traditional states. The perception that Pakistan has control of its own 
1 Q^ 
territory and can find and eliminate Taliban elements within its own country are false. 
The Taliban's ability to transcend Pakistani borders is based on a long history of support 
from Pakistani leaders. When the Taliban were picked as Pakistan's favorites to control 
Afghanistan, "Pakistan's military and civilian leaders insisted that the Taliban's success 
was Pakistan's success and that its policy was correct and unchangeable."194 Pakistani 
officials believed that by supporting the Taliban they would eliminate Iranian, Russian, 
Indian and Christian influences in their region, and by spreading the message of the 
" Ibid., 67-68. 
'
2
 "The Insanity Clause," The Economist, May 7, 2011, 48. 
13
 Rashid, Taliban, 185. 
14
 Ibid., 194. 
55 
Afghan Mujaheddin they would "revive Islam and create a new Pakistan-led Islamic 
block of nations."195 This perception lives on, to some extent, today and has proved to be 
a constant source of doubt and indignation for Pakistan in the Afghan War and Taliban 
insurgency. 
Whether or not the allegations against Pakistan are true doesn't matter, the 
damage is done. The Afghan War took a seemingly insurmountable toll on Pakistan 
economically and politically.196 Pakistan sacrificed hundreds of soldiers' lives, millions of 
dollars, and suffered thousands of terrorist attacks during the war.197 However, in a uni-
multipolar world which depends on the alliance and cooperation of lesser powers in order 
to balance the power of a hegemon, Pakistan has no one to turn to and is thus stuck 
tolerating the status-quo. Pakistan cannot forsake its allegiance to America's war on terror 
because it risks losing power in the region to India. However, an ailing economy and 
constant battles among Pakistani and American military forces and neo-Taliban in the 
border regions of Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) turned public 
opinion in Pakistan against the war and is helping fuel anti-American sentiment 
throughout the country.198 Pakistani policymakers are rethinking their long-term interests 
in Afghanistan and are beginning to speak out against perceptions of American 
hegemony in the region. In fact, they are boldly declaring that the US lacks understanding 
of the situation in Pakistan; that the US is taking its Pakistani alliance for granted; and 
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that Pakistan's support for the US war in Afghanistan is ultimately destabilizing its own 
country.199 Thus the power constellation containing Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the 
United States in Southeast Asia is shifting. As more and more Pakistani officials in the 
government and military see the United States as a threat, Pakistan seeks to balance 
America's growing power with Chinese allies. 
Pakistan is desperately appealing to China. Much has been made of a trip there 
from which the prime minister, Yusuf Raza Gilani, has just returned. The 
government appears to see China as some kind of replacement for the Americans 
in Pakistan, and perhaps in Afghanistan too. Much is fantasy. Even the Chinese 
privately urge Pakistan to put down the extremists, repair relations with America 
and get its economy moving.200 
Since the beginning of the Afghan War, the United States has been trying to 
establish material and ideational hegemony in Afghanistan, or what Beyer would call 
"thick" hegemony. By sponsoring the state building process in Afghanistan, the United 
States helped create a government of client-elites who found it in their best interest to 
align themselves with their Western sponsor and cooperate under an asymmetrical power 
arrangement within a very small geographic area.201 However, US "thick" hegemony in 
Afghanistan has failed to materialize over the years. The United States used its material 
dominance in the region to appear a powerful hegemon, however it never gained the 
legitimacy needed to establish soft power and ideational hegemony among Afghan 
citizens, and Pakistani allies. Hegemonic stability theory explains the relationship that 
developed in Afghanistan among the United States, the newly formed Afghan 
government, and regional influence from the Pakistani government. 
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Hegemonic stability theory argues that the role of the hegemon can be a 
collectively beneficial one in ensuring order via the promotion of political institutions, 
the implementation of norms and the facilitation of cooperation.202 Through multilateral, 
non-selfish behavior, the hegemon's material dominance "is accepted by other states as 
more profitable than threatening. The hegemon thus acquires ideational power: namely 
soft power and legitimacy."203 Cooperation under asymmetry between the United States 
and the newly established Afghan government was not the result of well established 
diplomatic ties between Bush and Karzai or the collective will of Afghans to see 
democracy and freedom transform their nation. Karzai and other Afghan government 
officials cooperated with the United States because the multilateral, constructive efforts 
of coalition forces transformed the logic of interaction in the direction of cooperation.204 
The tendency towards equilibrium through alternate means of power balancing (such as 
violent, competitive relations) is absent as the cooperation of unequal partners is 
interpreted as achieving both party's needs at the state level. 
While the relationship between the United States and the Afghan government at 
the state level favors cooperation, this sentiment is not echoed at the sub-state level. 
Popular opinion of the United States as a benign hegemon does not exist in Afghanistan. 
According to international polling in 2009, only 47% of Afghans view the United States 
"favorably" and just 37% of Afghans say they support NATO/IS AF forces in their 
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area.205 Turmoil and resentment is growing at the sub-state level among Afghan citizens 
and tribes. As the scholarship regarding corruption in the Afghan government shows, 
there is a serious lack of trust and legitimacy between citizens and government in 
Afghanistan. This is particularly prevalent in rural areas where the neo-Taliban vie for 
power by providing traditional state services where the Afghan government or coalition 
forces are absent.206 Thus the Taliban continue to represent an "antihegemonic coalition," 
developed at sub-state levels of the multipolar system within Afghanistan in order to 
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counter American superpowerdom and American attempts at hegemony in the region. 
Huntington points out that actors respond in various ways to American hegemony 
throughout the world, "At a relatively low level are widespread feelings of fear, 
resentment, and envy[...]At a somewhat higher level, resentment may turn to dissent, with 
other countries, including allies, refusing to cooperate[...]In a few cases, dissent has 
turned to outright opposition as countries attempt to defeat U.S. policy. The highest level 
of response would be the formation of an antihegemonic coalition involving several 
major powers."208 Huntington argues that in a uni-multipolar system, such a grouping of 
actors in opposition to one superpower would be a natural phenomenon. Thus we begin 
to see how the neo-Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan can be interpreted as an 
"antihegemonic coalition" of actors, driven by a logical desire to balance against the 
hegemonic tendencies of an overbearing actor within their system. According to this 
205
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perspective and building on Beyer's finding in her analysis on Terrorism in the Middle 
East, the Taliban and neo-Taliban insurgency are symptoms of natural balancing 
tendencies within the uni-multipolar system.209 
Intervention and Insurgency Strategy and the Logic of "tit-for-tat" Reciprocity: 
Antonio Giustozzi succinctly describes the opposing strategies of neo-Taliban 
insurgents and NATO forces in his research. The conflict, he observes: 
Pitts Taliban strength (abundance of committed, ideologically indoctrinated 
young fighters, able to achieve basic tasks even without supervision by field 
commanders) against government/coalition weaknesses (shortage of manpower, 
little presence in the villages, inability to patrol extensively away from the main 
roads, lack of effective intelligence network).210 
Analysts agree that counterinsurgency operations are largely ineffective and 
undermanned in rural parts of Afghanistan.211 Due to lack of financial support and troop 
presence, U.S. counterinsurgency efforts beginning in 2002 were conducted using "sweep 
and clear" tactics. Giustozzi defines three main reasons why sweep and clear tactics 
failed to eradicate the neo-Taliban insurgency. First, US heavy-handed, intrusive tactics 
invaded Afghan's privacy and broke Afghan tribal and ethical codes of behavior. Second, 
formation and reliance on local anti-Taliban strongmen and militias in counterinsurgency 
efforts led to more abuse of rural populations. Third, heavy reliance on airstrikes led to 
increased collateral damage, distrust, and fear among Afghan civilians. In 2010 the 
United Nations Assistant Mission in Afghanistan (UN AM A) recorded 171 civilian deaths 
due to air strike and close air support, and 102 civilian deaths due to search and seizure or 
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"raid" operations.212 Overall, sweep and clear tactics undermined US credibility and led 
local populations to fear and despise the forceful imposition of US material and 
ideational power. 
In 2005 the U.S. military changed its counterinsurgency tactics. Realizing the 
ineffectiveness of sweep and clear operations, they initiated a "village-focused" 
counterinsurgency approach.213 With increased funds devoted to counterinsurgency 
efforts, the military introduced a series of "development" projects which sought to 
combat the insurgency by providing services and jobs to local Afghans based on a 
"benefits-for-information" approach. The logic behind this new approach was based on 
the belief that distributing aid and providing jobs would win local support and also create 
pro-government informers.214 The benefits-for-information approach essentially 
established a system of patronage between the U.S. military and Afghan civilians based 
on the provision of information about insurgent activities.215 From an equilibrium 
standpoint, the United States was trying to use its power to promote both material and 
ideational incentives for sub-state cooperation. 
By 2006, the Taliban had amassed so many combatants that the safety and 
viability of small reconstruction teams dispersed throughout villages and towns were 
compromised. District garrisons of British and US troops were besieged by Taliban 
forces concentrated in the hundreds and sometimes thousands throughout Helmand and 
212
 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), Afghanistan: Annual Report 2010, 
Protection of Civilians In Armed Conflict (Kabul: Afghanistan, 2011): 21-29. 
21
 Giustozzi, Koran Kalashnikov, and Laptop, 194. 
214




other parts of Southern Afghanistan. NATOs counterinsurgency strategy was forced to 
shift back towards a "sweep and clear" approach and large-scale military operations were 
re-implemented in order to push the Taliban back. By 2007, US government officials 
917 
acknowledged the growing insurgency in Afghanistan. However, as Giustozzi and 
Jones point out in their research, the continuous alterations in military strategy adopted to 
deal with the insurgency led to confusion both logistically and financially within NATO, 
ultimately impeding their ability develop an effective way to combat the Taliban 
throughout Afghanistan. 
US, Canadian, and British forces now employ a wide variety of 
counterinsurgency tactics, ranging from sweep and clear operations to small scale 
development operations. Dutch, German, and Australian troops, critical of America's 
heavy reliance on airpower and overwhelming force, distance themselves from American 
counterinsurgency strategy.218 Crews and Sarwari write that "German troops admit that 
they avoided mixing with Americans out of fear that Afghans will fail to distinguish 
between them or that they will lose their 'good reputation' among Afghans."219 Dutch 
and Australian forces adopted the "Dutch approach" to counterinsurgency, which focuses 
on supporting local government and establishing contact with the population instead of 
finding and eliminating insurgents.220 Dutch forces argue that Americans "were very 
arrogant and focused on destroying the 'Taliban' without even knowing exactly who 
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[they] were." The ad-hoc implementation of multiple, conflicting counterinsurgency 
strategies by often-times uncoordinated NATO forces is ineffective at eliminating the 
neo-Taliban insurgency. Additionally, it demonstrates a lack efficient use of material 
dominance among coalition forces at all levels. 
Use of excessive force and airpower during counterinsurgency operations was a 
constant thorn in NATO's side since the beginning of the war when the tactic was used 
effectively to uproot and kill al-Qaeda forces still hiding in Afghanistan. Applying 
Beyer's use of tit-for-tat reciprocity within the synthetic framework adds additional 
insight into why material and psychological harm among the population can be so 
detrimental for the superpower's ability to maintain its power and establish hegemony. 
Tit-for-tat, according to Robert Axelrod, describes a strategy of interaction between 
actors which proclaims a strict reciprocity: "cooperation answered with cooperation, 
defection with defection."222 Tit-for-tat is a balancing strategy in which actors expect the 
actions of others to be reciprocal behavior which recreates or maintains equilibrium. This 
reciprocity, argues Beyer, can take the form of either positive or negative action towards 
the other actor. 
Therefore, the "enactment of power in an oppositional (offensive or violent) way 
leads to more violence (and hence to counter-violence) rather than submission, 
particularly in the absence of soft power."223 Using the logic of tit-for-tat and equilibrium, 
we find that violence (mistaken or intended) in the form of counterinsurgency operations 
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is a reason for insurgents to engage in counter-violence in a reciprocal fashion in order to 
restore what they interpret as the equilibrium of power at the sub-state level. In 
Afghanistan, the reciprocal nature of violence has both an ideational and material 
component. Ideologically, collateral damage and the loss of civilian life can be used by 
the Taliban to "validate their narratives that the conflict in Afghanistan is 'a cosmic 
994 
conflict between the righteous' and the infidel who want to kill innocent Muslims.'" 
Additionally, cultural dynamics influence violence in Afghanistan. Afghans, especially 
Pashtuns are historically independent and highly xenophobic.225 Local tribal codes of 
behavior and honor advocate revenge in the form of reciprocal acts of violence, thus 
promoting tit-for-tat behavior for acts of violence committed by NATO forces 
accidentally.22 
Materially, reciprocal attacks by insurgents can be measured in a number of ways. 
Because defeating the Afghan insurgency is now a battle for the "hearts and minds" of the 
people, measuring civilian casualties provides insight into escalating levels of insurgent 
violence. In addition to conducting armed engagements, guerilla operations, and planting 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs), neo-Taliban insurgents use civilians as targets and 
as human shields in order to maximize collateral damage and combat pro-government 
and pro-Western forces. In 2010, UNAMA reported a massive campaign of civilian 
assassinations carried out by neo-Taliban insurgents as a major strategy to counter pro-
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government and NATO "surge" operations.227 UNAMA reports that in the southern 
regions of Afghanistan,228 where insurgents are most active, civilian casualties totaled 
2,777 in 2010, a 20 percent increase over 2009 civilian casualties. Deliberate civilian 
assassinations and increased civilian casualties illustrate a ruthless campaign of tit-for-tat 
reciprocity on the part of the neo-Taliban which aims to undermine the power of NATO 
and government forces by turning the population against them. 
Corruption and Ineptitude In the Afghan Government: 
Arguably the most prominent political problem facing the legitimization of US 
power and "thick" hegemony in Afghanistan is the corruption of state government. The 
variable which best explains the rise of corruption and ineptitude in the Afghan 
government is lack of US funding.229 However, even when there is funding for 
reconstruction projects sponsored by the government, in most cases, the money provided 
never reaches its intended target.230 Analysts who address corruption in the Afghan 
government agree that external money is fueling the neo-Taliban insurgency and must be 
stopped. However, proposals usually call for sweeping, extensive anti-corruption 
measures to be implemented within government, police, and armed forces; the 
prosecution of narcotics traffickers; and the promotion of a sense of government 
legitimacy among local Afghans.231 Blanket statements calling for the confrontation of 
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corruption and the improvement of competence and legitimacy of the national and local 
Afghan government are all stymied by the fact that US relations with regional and 
international actors are not robust enough to convince local populations that the United 
States and the Afghan government are less corrupt and more efficient than their neo-
Taliban competitors.232 
Seth Jones identifies two main motivations for why Afghan insurgents fight: 
religion and government. In some cases, Jones explains, insurgents were not recruited 
because of their love of the Taliban but because of their hatred for the Afghan 
government.234 According to a report by the Center for Strategies and International 
Studies (CSIS), 42 percent of Afghans believe their country is heading in the wrong 
direction due to governmental problems.235 The Taliban's rule during the 1990s made 
many Afghans adverse to their brutal punishments and harsh laws. Afghans who wanted 
to support the insurgency but had no religious or ideological motivations found different 
reasons to fight. Those reasons are often validated by perceptions that their government is 
corrupt, unrepresentative, and inept. According to polls, 12 percent of Afghans blame 
violence in the country on the Afghan government.23 Corruption in government presents 
both an ideational and material equilibrium problem for Afghan citizens. Corruption 
causes disequilibrium in the form of poverty, widespread unemployment, and wealth at 
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the material end and cultural and religious disequilibrium at the ideological end. Many 
Afghan citizens feel that their government is a Western puppet, incapable of governing 
anything more than major urban areas. Afghans also have ideological reasons for 
despising their government, which are grounded in ethnicity. The alienated Pashtun 
communities in Southern and South-East Afghanistan are generalized as Taliban 
sympathizers and largely absent from government posts. 
The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, written by Lt. 
Colonel John A. Nagl, states that "a counterinsurgency effort cannot achieve lasting 
success without the host nation government achieving legitimacy."239 The manual also 
gives a set of six indicators with which to determine government "legitimacy. ,.240 
Table 3241 
Indicators of Government Legitimacy According to the U.S. Army/Marine Corps 
___^ Counterinsurgency Field Manual. 
1. Ability to provide security for the populace. 
2. Selection of leaders at a frequency and in a manner considered just and fair by a 
substantial majority of the populace. 
3. Culturally acceptable levels of corruption. 
4. A high level of participation in or support for political processes. 
5. A culturally acceptable level and rate of political, economic and social development. 
6. A high level of regime acceptance by major institutions. 
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Unfortunately, Afghanistan's model of centralized government does not fulfill the 
requirements of any of the indicators. The 2001 Bonn Agreement and 2004 Afghan 
constitution paved the way for the establishment of a centralized government which 
places "virtually all executive, legislative, and judicial authority in the national 
government."242 The president appoints every significant official in the executive branch, 
all security forces are national forces, and Kabul holds all policy, budgetary, and revenue-
generating authority. The United States crafted its Afghanistan strategy on the 
assumption that stability would be achieved by building a strong central government, a 
long-term objective which insurgents effectively learned how to sabotage.244 
Resentment for the Afghan national government is a breeding ground for 
insurgency and a basis for its support. Taliban and neo-Taliban recruiters use the 
frustration and disenfranchisement of local populations to "legitimize their actions and to 
find human resources for recruitment. They not only capitalize on it, they instrumentahze 
it by attempting or promising to attempt a recreation of the equilibrium, and to reinstall 
'justice', or even a certain alternative regional or world order." 4 The Taliban insurgency, 
therefore, views corruption and ineptitude in the Afghan government as justification for 
counterbalancing actions. Finally, retaliation based on the logic of power equilibrium, in 
the form of violence against NATO and ISAF forces, becomes the insurgency's method 
of mimicking the balancing that is absent at the state level.24 
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Almost all researchers agree that stable governance is an essential component for 
defeating the insurgency in Afghanistan. Countless public officials pay lip service to the 
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necessity of implementing a strong government. However, attempts to stem the de-
facto partition of Afghanistan's countryside by neo-Taliban insurgents are insufficient. 
Jones describes the governance dilemma in Afghanistan according to Aesop's fable, 
"Belling the Cat." 
A group of mice called together a committee to consider how to protect 
themselves from a cat that was harassing them. The best solution, one mouse 
proposed, was to bell the cat, which was met with general applause. But this left 
one key question: Who would put the bell around the cat's neck? 'This was a 
question of implementation, since there were no volunteers, the policy was 
useless.249 
Sufficient implementation and support for Afghanistan's governmental institutions 
is the Achilles' heel of US power in the region. Analysts recognize that the Afghan 
government has not lived up to the model of centralized government established at Bonn 
and in the Afghan constitution. The result is a government unable to provide key services 
or protect the local population, especially in rural areas.250 Thus the government is 
pegged as corrupt, inept, and unrepresentative of Afghanistan's rich ethnic and tribal 
heritages. Ultimately, ineffectual governance in Afghanistan is a key variable which 
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control, civilians become more likely to fight their "disgusting government" both because 





The Future of the neo-Taliban Insurgency In Afghanistan: 
According to Seth Jones, Afghanistan's insurgency was caused by a supply of 
disgruntled villagers unhappy with their government, and a demand for recruits by 
ideologically motivated leaders. "Too little outside support for the Afghan government 
and too much support for insurgents further undermined governance. This combination 
proved deadly for the onset — and continuation ~ of the insurgency."252 Using Beyer's 
synthetic approach, this analysis finds that the major factors leading to the neo-Taliban 
insurgency in Afghanistan can be traced back to imbalances of ideational and material 
power between the United States, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. These imbalances prevented 
the establishment of US "thick" hegemony and allowed the Taliban to remain a player in 
the region as a legitimate "antihegemonic coalition." In order for the United States, its 
allies, and the Afghan government to successfully withstand the neo-Taliban insurgency 
in Afghanistan, several key areas of power imbalance must be addressed. This analysis 
finds that there are three important power dynamics within the Afghan insurgency at the 
global, state, and sub-state levels of analysis. These dynamics can be categorized as: (1) 
the relationship between the United States, Pakistan, and the Afghan government, (2) the 
relationship between the Afghan government, NATO forces and Afghan citizens, and (3) 
the relationship between neo-Taliban insurgents, Afghan citizens, and pro-Western/pro-
government forces. A synthetic analysis of the relationships among actors at all levels of 
252
 Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires, 315. 
71 
the Afghan War reveals the significance of material and ideational power equilibrium at 
all levels of international relations. The information provided by this analysis contributes 
to a growing field of international relations theorists, scholars and policymakers who 
argue that the United States must beat the Taliban at the local level by developing 
comprehensive political solutions, not just military solutions.253 
The Afghan War is both a war of material might and a war of ideas. The United 
States must find a way to make its material power work in harmony with its ideational 
power. The US possesses the military might to crush Taliban forces on the battlefield, but 
its ability to do so is hampered by a corrupt domestic government and declining popular 
opinion among Afghan citizens. Synthetic analysis of the Afghan insurgency shows that 
the United States and the Afghan government have the material means to win the war but 
lack the soft power and legitimacy to consistently win the "hearts and minds" of the 
Afghan people. Comparison of key material factors indicates that although US spending 
and troop levels have increased over time, Taliban insurgency levels and presence have 
not consistently decreased or been eliminated. The inability of NATO forces to eliminate 
Taliban influence in Afghanistan is not simply due to lack of funding or troop levels. 
There is a severe lack of ideational soft power among NATO and Afghan government 
forces that is undermining their efforts at the military level. Until an appropriate 
equilibrium is reached at the ideational level, NATO and Afghan forces will not be able 
to defeat the Taliban through military means. This is not to suggest that material or hard 
power does not matter; training and developing the Afghan National Army and Police are 
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pivotal to success in Afghanistan. However, placing too much burden on material means 
without sufficient ideational backing is a serious mistake. 
Table 4 
Key Indicators of neo-Taliban and U.S. Material Forces In Afghanistan. 
Year 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 
Number of US 5,200 15,200 20,400 30,100 63,000 
forces in 
Afghanistan2'4 
















 Data Source: Amy Belasco, "Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012: Cost and 
Other Potential Issues," Congressional Research Service (July 2, 2009). 
Data Source: Giustozzi, Koran Kalashnikov, and Laptop, 35. 
256
 Data Source: Kenneth Katzman, "Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy," 
Congressional Research Service (January 26, 2011). 
257
 Neo-Taliban "presence" is achieved in a province if the province experiences an average of one or more 
insurgent attacks per month. 
Data Sources: "Taliban presence seen across almost all Afghanistan," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 
September 10, 2009, accessed July 14, 2011, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4aaf5c87c.html; Rod 
Nordland, "Security in Afghanistan Is Deteriorating, Aid Groups Say," The New York Times, September 
11, 2010, accessed July 14, 2011, http://www.nytimes.eom/2010/09/l2/world/asia/l2afghan.html? r=l; 
Data also gathered from various maps and tables published by ICOSMAPS, found at 
http://www.icosmaps.net/taliban presence/041 2 map/iframe 3#top and 
http://www.icosmaps.net/taliban presence/iframe2; Katzman, "Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance," 
2011. 
73 
Joseph Nye describes power in the 21st century as a three-dimensional chess 
game: 
On the top board of the three-dimensional game, the United States is the world's 
only superpower. But if you go to the middle board, of economic relations 
between states, there is already a balance of power. If you go to the bottom board 
of transnational relations, problems cross borders outside the control of 
governments, whether it's infectious diseases or drug smuggling or terrorism, no 
one is in charge; power is chaotically organized or distributed. 
Nye argues that while military power can be of some use occasionally on the bottom 
board, more often than not you will need other forms of power, particularly soft power in 
order to achieve your goals.259 Synthetic analysis of the neo-Taliban insurgency confirms 
Nye's perspective. According to Nye, soft power is essential to be able to attract majority 
of citizens to better opportunities, education, health care, justice, and dignity.260 The 
United States will not prevail in Afghanistan until the neo-Taliban can no longer recruit 
and radicalize Afghanistan's moderate citizens. As of 2009, only 22 percent of Afghan 
citizens say that the Taliban has popular support in their area.262 NATO and the Afghan 
government must continue to attract the moderates and the majority of Afghans to their 
cause in order to bolster their soft power in the fight against the neo-Taliban. 
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Fighting On the "Ideational" Front: Can the United States, NATO and the Afghan 
Government Gain Soft Power? 
Table 5263 
Key Indicators of NATO and Afghan Government "soft power" Among Afghan Citizens 
In 2009. 
Afghans who blame the US, Afghan, or NATO forces for the 36% 
country's violence. 
Afghans who call the U.S.-led invasion and overthrow of the 69% 
Taliban a good thing for their country. 
Afghans who support the presence of the US military in 63% 
Afghanistan. 
Afghans who sec official corruption as a problem in their 85% 
country. 
Afghans who think the government will defeat the Taliban 33% 
with foreign support. 
Afghans who think the government is making progress in 59% 
providing a better life for Afghans. ________ 
Nye argues that in order to increase its soft power, the United States must change 
both the substance and style of its foreign policy.264 Ideally, restoring soft power can be 
accomplished by reducing unilateralism and increasing government-to-government and 
government-to-civilian cooperation. The "with us or against us" approach of the Bush 
administration's War on Terror put the future of the Taliban and Afghanistan in black and 
white terms. The Taliban and al-Qaeda were the enemy and there would be no 
compromise. However, as the layers of al-Qaeda influence and involvement are peeled 
away from the Taliban, and researchers continue to develop an understanding of who the 
Taliban are; analysts and policymakers are adjusting their outlook. On June 18th, 2011 
President Karzai announced that the US is engaged in talks with the Taliban.266 In July 
Data Source: Cordesman, "Afghan Public Opinion and the Afghan War." 
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2011, US Defense Secretary Robert Gates stated that there could be political talks with 
the Taliban by the end of the year. The United Nations has also split a sanctions blacklist 
for the Taliban and al-Qaeda, hoping to encourage the Taliban to join reconciliation 
efforts and the political process.267 
A revived political approach based on engaging "moderate" elements of the neo-
Taliban and reintegrating them into the political process provide NATO and the Afghan 
government with a moderate amount of legitimacy and soft power. However, unilateral 
actions by the United States based on inaccurate perceptions of power and world politics 
continues to hinder progress at the second and third level dimensions of the Afghan War. 
The US raid to kill Osama bin Laden in Pakistan, and relentless NATO air strikes show 
that the United States still focuses on unilateral, military preeminence when it wants to 
get a job done. This approach deteriorates relations between the United States, the 
Afghan government, and Pakistan.268 In May of 2011, a NATO airstrike killed 12 
children, prompting Karzai to issue a "last warning" to NATO to stop what he described 
as "arbitrary" operations by foreign forces.269 Likewise, the killing of bin Laden made 
previously tense relations between the United States and Pakistan appear even more 
volatile.270 
The deteriorating relations among major state actors in Afghanistan calls into 
question the long-term stability of the power constellation that is developing in the 
region. The political attitudes of Pakistan and the Afghan government are becoming 
266
 "Afghanistan's Karzai: US in peace talks with Taliban," BBC News, June 18, 2011, accessed June 18, 
2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-13821452. 
267
 "US in peace talks with Taliban." 
269
 Sommerville, "Afghan leader Karzai issues 'last warning' to NATO." 
270
 "Insanity Clause," 48. 
76 
increasingly volatile. As each actor continues to speak out against the other, condemning 
unilateral actions and calling into question each other's unity of purpose; any prospects of 
US ideational hegemony succeeding in Afghanistan look dimmer and dimmer. In reality, 
the ideational powers of actors in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia are constantly being 
contested. The United States is slowly coming to the realization that ideational hegemony 
cannot be achieved in Afghanistan as long as its relations with Pakistan and the Afghan 
government remain unstable. This instability is easily preyed upon by the Taliban 
insurgency and provides them with motivation to continue their balancing tendencies 
(both materially and ideationally) in order to gain an advantage over their regional rivals 
and survive as a political movement. 
In conclusion, the most important reason why the Taliban insurgency still exists 
after ten years of war is the lack of "thick" hegemony in Afghanistan and the region 
among state actors. The Taliban were not defeated in 2001, they simply reverted to their 
mid 90s existence as a stateless, Islamic Fundamentalist movement. When they 
reemerged from Pakistan's tribal areas, the Taliban were dubbed "neo-Taliban" by 
researchers in an effort to understand their new insurgency tactics and illustrate the fact 
that the Taliban had changed but also stayed the same in many ways. With a renewed 
sense of insurgency and revolution, the Taliban began challenging the position and power 
of the United States, Pakistan, and the newly formed Afghan government within the 
region. The Taliban have proven that with or without control of the Afghan state, they 
have garnered a position of ideational and material significance within regions of 
Afghanistan and Pakistan that cannot be hindered using hearts and minds tactics, political 
rhetoric, money, state borders, or military might. This analysis suggests that as long as 
77 
ideational hegemony is not established among the United States, Pakistan, and the 
Afghan government, the Taliban insurgency will continue to play a role within the uni-
multipolar power constellation of the region. 
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